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Abstract
Do fiscal stabilization policies affect the long-term growth of the economy? If so,
are the long-term effects growth-enhancing or growth-reducing? These questions have
again become relevant to the political and academic debate since governments have
been forced to spend considerable funds for economic stimulus packages as a response
to the recent economic crisis. The answers provided by the economic literature are
inconclusive. But a general observation is that, while the theoretical literature has
emphasized the importance of structural issues as, e.g., the modeling approach of en-
dogenous technological change, less attention has been paid to an elaborate design
of the considered fiscal stabilization policies. This paper uses a closed agent-based
macroeconomic model that generates endogenous business cycles to emphasize the role
of the policy design for long-term growth effects of stabilization policies. By comparing
a demand-oriented consumption policy and two different investment subsidizing poli-
cies, we can show that the considered policies are equally successful in smoothing the
business cycle, but have different implications for the medium and long-term growth of
the economy. Hence, not only modeling assumptions as stressed by the literature but
also the concrete implementation of the policy seems to be important for the analysis
of long-term effects of stabilization policies.
Keywords: Business cycle; long-term growth; stabilization policy; agent-based model
JEL Classification: C63, E32, O33
1 Introduction
The recent world economic crisis marks the deepest downturn in the postwar era. Triggered
by the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States that evolved into a world financial
liquidity crisis, the recession affected the entire world economy, with greater detriment to
some countries than others. According to OECD statistics, the U.S. economy declined by
3.5% from the first quarter in 2008 to the second quarter in 2009, whereas Japan recorded
a contraction of 8.0% in the same period. In the area of the European monetary union,
economic activity fell by 5.1% and in Germany as the biggest economy in the Euro area,
the GDP declined by 6.3% (see OECD, 2010b). This severe economic contraction forced
many governments to take appropriate countermeasures. Looking back, discretionary fiscal
policies can be identified as a central tool applied to counteract the recession. In fact,
the U.S. administration enacted economic stimulus packages in the years 2008 and 2009
accounting for 5.6% of the GDP in 2008. For Japan and Germany, the relative sizes of the
economic recovery plans were lower but with 4.7% for Japan and 3.2% for Germany still
remarkable (see OECD, 2010a).
Stabilization policies that aim at alleviating the effects of economic downturns have
been the focus of a passionate decades-long dispute in macroeconomics that yet remains to
be resolved. For a long time, the central question had been whether stabilization policies
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are at all effective tools to smooth business cycles. The endogenous growth theory and
its implication that any type of shock - be it temporary or permanent, real or nominal -
can have permanent effects in the long run opened a new perspective: the link between
short-term volatility and long-term growth. Inspired by this new perspective, a strand of
the subsequent growth literature dealt with the question of whether stabilization policies
will reduce or enhance long-term growth. A drawback of a large part of this literature
is, however, that it has paid less attention at incorporating a concrete stabilization policy
in order to check whether the policy itself introduces implications for long-term growth.
Instead, conclusions regarding the connection between stabilization policies and long-term
growth have solely been derived from considering the link between short-term volatility and
long-term growth. And in the sparse attempts that have explicitly accounted for stabilization
policies, the explanation of the direction of possible long-term effects of stabilization policies
has been focused on either the modeling approach of endogenous technological change or
the source of shocks driving the short-term volatility.
The concern of this paper is the important, but largely neglected, question whether the
design of fiscal stabilization policies matters for the long-term effects of the policies. We
use a closed agent-based macroeconomic model that generates endogenous business cycles
in order to show that alternative fiscal policies can have different implications for long-term
growth. More precisely, we run policy experiments in which three distinct fiscal policy
measures are applied to mitigate the amplitude of the business cycle. The first policy
provides consumption subsidies to households and the two other policies provide investment
subsidies to firms. The difference between the investment subsidies is that the one policy
subsidizes any investment in the physical capital stock of firms and the other only those
that flow in the most up-to-date technology. We can show that all policies are equally
effective in smoothing business cycles but differ substantially in their implications for long-
term growth. In particular, the technology subsidy is associated with a strong positive effect
on long-term growth while the consumption subsidy leads only to a weak positive effect. And
the investment subsidy has even a negative effect on the growth rate.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a literature review of stabilization
policies and long-term growth. Section 3 lays out the model and reports some generic
properties of simulation outcome generated with the model. Section 4 contains the analysis
of the three stabilization policies. Section 5 concludes.
2 Stabilization Policies and Long-term Growth in the
Literature
The importance of discretionary fiscal policies during the economic crisis does not correspond
with the role that fiscal policy has recently played in contemporary macroeconomics. From a
historical perspective, fiscal policy had been the central macroeconomic tool in the aftermath
of the Great Depression and the following era of Keynesian macroeconomics (see Blanchard
et al., 2010). But over the decades, the focus has moved from fiscal to monetary policy
and in the past two decades fiscal policy has clearly taken a backseat (e.g., Eichenbaum,
1997). There are manifold possible reasons for the declining importance of fiscal policy.
One is certainly the general skepticism regarding the effectiveness of fiscal policy as stressed
by the New Classical school (e.g., Lucas and Sargent, 1979). Another reason concerns
problems of time lags in detecting recessions and the implementation of policies as well as
issues related to the political economy. A third possible explanation is related to the Great
Moderation, which is the empirically observed phenomenon of a substantial reduction in the
volatility of U.S. business cycle fluctuations starting in the mid-1980s (Blanchard and Simon,
2001; Stock and Watson, 2003). Some studies such as Summers (2005) have shown that an
improved monetary policy can explain the emergence of the moderation. But if there is
already an effective policy to stabilize the business cycle, then there is no need for another
policy instrument such as fiscal policies. The question remains, however, why governments
have used fiscal policies so extensively during the crisis. Blanchard et al. (2010) argue that
monetary policy, including quantitative easing and credit, had largely reached the limits
with the result that policymakers had little choice but to rely on fiscal policy. Furthermore,
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fiscal stimulus measures had generally been more accepted by policymakers even before the
crises and had been used in many instances, not only as a response to severe shocks.
Until the 1980s, short-term fluctuations and long-term economic growth had been consid-
ered as two coexisting and independent phenomena by most mainstream macroeconomists,
leading to a major divide in macroeconomic theory. On the one side, business cycle theorists
had considered long-term growth as an exogenous trend and analyzed the cyclical component
by typically using Keynesian macroeconomic models. On the other side, growth theorists
had typically used Neoclassical growth models to analyze the trend component, where short-
term shocks had no impact on the long-term growth rate of the economy (e.g., Martin and
Rogers, 2000; Gaggl and Steindl, 2008). Stabilization policies that aim at smoothing the
business cycles had then been analyzed in the context of short-term models neglecting any
possible effect on the long-term growth rate. This traditional dichotomy eroded when Nelson
and Plosser (1982) found empirical evidence showing that long historical U.S. time series
data could be characterized by non-stationary processes that have no tendency to return to
a deterministic path. When decomposing the time series in a secular and a cyclical com-
ponent, shocks to the secular component would substantially contribute to the variation
in observed output. As a consequence, Nelson and Plosser (1982) questioned the general
separation of business cycle and growth theory.
Real Business Cycle (RBC) and New Keynesian models, which represent the predomi-
nating branches in macroeconomic theory within the 1980s and 1990s, were the first models
incorporating business cycles and long-term growth in a unified framework. Modern main-
stream macroeconomics combines elements of both approaches with the result that the major
workhorse in contemporary macroeconomics are models that feature the structure of RBC
models and inherited nominal rigidities from New Keynesian models (e.g., Woodford, 2009).
In any case, the line of research that has applied models with RBC and/or New Keynesian
features is basically interested in replicating business cycles and analyzing transient effects
of shocks on macroeconomic aggregates. The determination of long-run growth is not the
question of this research per se (Gaggl and Steindl, 2008). Since the steady state growth is
exogenous by construction, these models cannot account for a causal relationship between
short-term volatility and long-term growth as evidenced by Nelson and Plosser (1982).
The endogenous growth literature has tried to fill this gap. In a typical endogenous
growth model, the process of technological change as the main driver of long-term growth
has endogenous determinants including investments in human capital and research and de-
velopment. Some of these determinants are influenced by the volatility of the business cycle,
which provides a connection between short-term fluctuations and long-term growth. In that
sense, endogenous technological progress acts as a propagation mechanism for shocks that
would only have transitory effects in a New Keynesian or RBC framework (Stadler, 1990).
The endogenous growth literature provides an ambiguous answer to the question of
the relationship between (the smoothing of) cyclical fluctuations and long-term growth.
In this context, two contrasting explanatory paradigms can be identified, reflecting two
different approaches for the modeling of endogenous technological change: the one following
Schumpeter’s concept of creative destruction and the other based on the learning-by-doing
hypothesis (see Priesmeier and Sta¨hler, 2011).
In models following the creative destruction hypothesis, one can typically find a positive
link between short-term fluctuations and long-term growth. This positive effect emerges as
recessions have a positive effect on the long-term productivity level of the economy. There
are basically two explanations for this positive relation. The first describes a cleansing effect
of recessions (Caballero and Hammour, 1994), through which unproductive firms that lack
competitiveness are driven out of the market. As a consequence, the overall productivity of
the economy will be higher when the economy recovers. The second explanation, used by
e.g. Aghion and Saint-Paul (1998), stresses the importance of procyclical opportunity costs
for productivity-enhancing activities. Activities such as research and development, training,
and implementation of new technologies are costly in terms of forgone current production
(Saint-Paul, 1997). This is because these activities tie up production capacities that are not
available for production. Therefore, in a recession when output is currently low, the cost
of such activities is low relative to their benefit, which includes increased production in the
future when the economy is back to an expansionary phase.
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In any case, the assumption of creative destruction being the main driver of endogenous
technological change implies a trade-off between short-term volatility reduction and long-
term growth. If the policy reduces the business cycle and therefore prevents the economy
to fall into recession, then it will also suppress the cleansing mechanism or, respectively, the
reduction of opportunity costs. As a result, the speed of technological change will eventually
fall. This implies a conflict of goals so that a government must sacrifice long-term growth
for achieving short-term stability.
Aghion et al. (2005) show that the opportunity cost argument is only valid if credit
markets are perfect. If credit markets are sufficiently imperfect, then productivity-enhancing
investments become procyclical and a reduction of the volatility would lead to higher growth.
In this scenario, the goals of short-term stabilization and long-term growth are not conflicting
any more. This finding is consistent with the results one typically obtains when considering
the alternative explanatory paradigm for endogenous technological change, the learning-by-
doing hypothesis. In models of this type as, e.g., Stadler (1990), Martin and Rogers (1997,
2000), the propagation mechanism is assumed to emerge through an endogenous formation of
human capital. Stadler (1990) describes the learning process as a by-product of production
in which workers build up skills and experiences during their employment. Since labor
can freely move between firms, the generated skills become an externality and constitute
to a common stock of technical knowledge. Periods during a negative output shock, when
output and employment are low, are forgone opportunities for learning-by-doing and have
a negative effect on the accumulation of human capital. If the employment is increasing
and concave in the business cycle disturbance, the forgone learning cannot be fully regained
over the next upswing (Martin and Rogers, 2000). Then, a transitory shock translates in a
permanent effect on the long-term growth path of the economy. In this case, a stabilization
policy counteracting a negative shock will have an enhancing effect on long-term growth.
But the picture is also not unambiguous for models based on the learning-by-doing hy-
pothesis. Blackburn (1999), for example, shows that it depends on the concrete specification
of the human capital accumulation function, i.e. the technology underlying the learning pro-
cess, to determine whether growth and volatility are positively related. And Blackburn and
Pelloni (2004) emphasize the source of the fluctuation. Their analysis of a monetary growth
model with nominal rigidities and learning-by-doing predicts that the relationship between
output growth and output volatility may be positive or negative according to whether real
or nominal shocks predominate.
The focus of most endogenous growth models has been on the relation of short-term
volatility on long-term growth, from which possible effects of stabilization policies are derived
as a corollary. This, however, does not include issues of formulation and evaluation of
stabilization policies, a point that has to some extent been neglected in the literature.
Blackburn (1999) and Blackburn and Pelloni (2005) consider monetary stabilization policies
governed by feedback rules. While the former finds a negative effect on long-term growth,
the latter find that the monetary stabilization policy may work either for or against the
promotion of long-term growth depending on the source of the fluctuations. Martin and
Rogers (1997) develop a model in which learning-by-doing is at the origin of growth and
analyze the effects of a fiscal stabilization policy that subsidizes labor during bad periods
and taxes in good times. They find that in many configurations of disturbances and model
parameters, the countercyclical tax policy can have positive effects on long-term growth by
minimizing the adverse effects that recessions have on learning-by-doing. These examples
illustrate that mostly structural aspects have been emphasized in the few investigations that
incorporate a concrete stabilization policy. These structural aspects include the specification
of the learning function (Blackburn, 1999), the nature of the shocks (Blackburn and Pelloni,
2005), and structural parameters controlling the severity of shocks, their likelihood to occur,
and the speed of learning (Martin and Rogers, 1997). But no emphasis has been put on
investigating the question whether different (fiscal) policies, which all aim at stabilizing the
business cycle, can have different implications for the long-term growth path.
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3 The Model
3.1 General Considerations
The aim of this paper is to address the question of possible links between different short-
term stabilization policies and long-term growth by means of an agent-based policy analysis.
The choice of the agent-based approach is backed up by generic properties of this approach,
which make it particularly suitable for the analysis of economic policies. One of these
characteristics is the flexible nature stemming from the fact that agent-based modeling is
freed from taking account of analytical tractability. The high degree of flexibility allows
adjusting the comprehensiveness of agent-based models to the macroeconomic phenomenon
under study (see LeBaron and Tesfatsion, 2008), which facilitates the development of models
with the necessary depth and complexity required for a thorough analysis of the policy
question at hand. Another strength of the approach stemming from its flexibility is that
it enables incorporating different policies in a unified model framework. This makes a
comparative analysis of different economic policies under identical laboratory conditions
possible in the first place.
Agent-based modeling is a disequilibrium approach considering the evolution of complex
adaptive systems from the bottom-up. The emerging out-of-equilibrium dynamics enable a
policy analysis on different time scales, where policy effects can typically be distinguished in
short- and long-term effects (see Dawid and Neugart, 2011). Considering different time scales
is especially useful in the context of short- and long-term effects of stabilization policies.
Furthermore, the bottom-up approach allows to explain the policy effects as the emerging
outcome of mechanisms interacting at the micro level.
The analysis is conducted with an extended version of the agent-based macro model
Eurace@Unibi. The original model has especially been used for policy analyses in the con-
text of regional convergence (e.g., Dawid et al., 2012a, 2014). One interesting property of
this model is its ability to generate endogenous business cycles with economically reason-
able characteristics. This makes the model suitable for the discussion of policies aiming
at smoothing the business cycle and offers a strong contrast to most dynamic equilibrium
models, in which exogenous stochastic shocks are the source of short-term fluctuations. The
fact that equilibrium models need exogenous shocks in order to introduce business cycles
has been criticized by, e.g., Dosi et al. (2006).
In the last ten years a number of closed macroeconomic models using an agent-based
approach have been developed (e.g., Gintis, 2007; Dosi et al., 2010; Delli Gatti et al., 2010;
Ashraf et al., 2011; Raberto et al., 2012; Wolf et al., 2013; Dosi et al., 2013; Riccetti et al.,
2013). Several of these agent-based macroeconomic models have shown the importance of
the approach for economic policy design. For example, Dosi et al. (2010) look into interaction
of policies aiming at the strengthening of demand and of policies facilitating the speed of
technological change. Monetary policies are addressed in Ashraf et al. (2012) or Arifovic
et al. (2013), whereas regulatory issues relating to credit and financial markets are analyzed
by Delli Gatti et al. (2010), Ashraf et al. (2011), Dosi et al. (2013) or Riccetti et al. (2013)
within agent-based macroeconomic models.
In the following subsections, we provide a description of the agent-based macro model,
thereby limiting the description on main aspects of the model that are crucial for the under-
standing of the results. An extensive description of the Eurace@Unibi model can be found
in Dawid et al. (2012b). And a detailed description of the model extensions is provided in
Harting (2014).
3.2 The Overall Structure
The model describes a market economy in which heterogeneous agents interact on different
markets. The agents populating the economy are households, firms, where we distinguish
consumption and capital goods producing firms, and banks. Additionally, there is a central
bank and a government, where the latter collects taxes and finances social benefits.
The focus of our analysis is on the real sector of the economy including a consumption
goods market, a capital goods market and a labor market. At the market for consumption
goods, firms produce a homogeneous consumption good that is sold at a central market
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place called outlet mall. Households are consumers and they purchase the consumption
good when visiting the outlet mall several times per month.
For the production of the consumption good, firms require labor and capital as inputs
which they can purchase at the corresponding factor markets. A monopolistic capital goods
firm produces vertically differentiated capital goods and offers several vintages of the capital
good at a time. The vintages differ with respect to productivity. From time to time, the
capital goods firm carries out a successful innovation and introduces a new vintage with an
improved quality onto the market. Thus, technological change is embodied as innovations
diffuse into the economy through capital goods investments.
The labor market is populated with workers that have either high or low general skills.
Moreover, workers build up technology specific skills on the job. A crucial assumption is
hereby that the specific skills of workers and the productivity of machines are linked in a
complementary way. This implies that better technologies can only be efficiently used when
workers have already acquired sufficient specific skills. Firms adjust the workforce according
to their labor demand where the labor market interactions are modeled as a search and
matching process.
Households earn a labor income or, if unemployed, they receive unemployment benefits
from the government. Moreover, since households are shareholders of firms, they receive
dividends. Based on the monthly income and driven by precautionary motives, households
determine once a month how much of the income they will spend for consumption.
Consumption goods firms retain parts of their profits as a cash reserve or for financing
capital investments. As an alternative financing source, firms can obtain external financing
at a credit market. Credits are provided by commercial banks which collect deposits of
firms and households. Whether a loan is accepted and how much interests the firm has to
pay depends on its financial standing. However, the ability to provide credits is limited by
regulations regarding capital requirements and cash reserves.
Firms that are not able to pay their financial commitments declare illiquidity. If debts
exceed wealth at the end of the production cycle, a firm has to declare insolvency. In both
cases, a bankrupt firm is liquidated after stopping production and dismissing all employees.
On the other side, new firms enter the market incidentally starting from scratch only endowed
with an initial stock of cash that is provided by a venture capitalist.
The financial sector is completed by a financial market at which agents can trade shares
of a single asset. This asset is an index bond that contains all firms and banks of the
economy. The total sum of dividends paid out by all firms is distributed among households
according to the number of shares a household owns. The central bank provides standing
facilities for the banks at a given base rate, pays interest on banks’ overnight deposits and
might provide fiat money to the government.
Finally, there is a statistical office (Eurostat) that collects data from all individual agents
in the economy and generates aggregate indicators according to standard procedures. These
indicators are distributed to the agents in the economy which might use them as input for
their decision rules.
The agents are characterized by bounded rationality, i.e., agents are limited to informa-
tion they have and agents cannot fully observe all the consequences of their own actions and
that of other agents. This requires the formulation of explicit rules describing how agents
build expectations and how they take their decisions based on the available information. In
our model, this is captured by modeling the decision-making of agents using a rule-based
approach; rule-based means that agents of the same type have an identical set of behavioral
rules, each specifically designed for solving a particular decision problem. The design of
the decision rules is based on a systematic attempt to incorporate empirically observable
behavior documented in the relevant literature. Concerning households, this means that
the saving rule and purchasing choice are described by using models from the Marketing
literature with strong empirical support. With respect to firm behavior, we follow the Man-
agement Science approach, which aims at implementing decision rules and heuristics that
match standard procedures of real world firms as described in the corresponding Manage-
ment literature. A more extensive discussion of the Management Science approach can be
found in Dawid and Harting (2012).
Agent actions can be time-driven or event-based, where the former can follow either
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subjective or objective time schedules. Furthermore, the economic activities follow a hier-
archy of time-scales: yearly, monthly, weekly and daily activities, all taking place following
calendar-time or subjective agent-time. Agents are activated asynchronously according to
their subjective time schedules that are anchored on an individual activation day. These
activation days are uniformly randomly distributed among the agents at the start of the
simulation, but may change endogenously (e.g., when a household gets re-employed, its
subjective month gets synchronized with the activation day of its employer due to wage
payments). This modeling approach is supposed to capture the decentralized and typically
asynchronous nature of decision-making processes and activities of economic agents.
3.3 Skill Dynamics
We assume that workers are characterized by two dimensions of human capital endowments.
The first dimension is the general skill level and can be interpreted as the formal qualification
and those abilities that a worker has obtained during schooling and professional education.
There are two skill groups bgenh ∈ {1,2} with bgenh referring to the general skill level of worker
h. The two groups represent low and high levels of general skills, where workers from skill
group 1 belong to the low-skill group and those with skill level 2 to the high-skill group.
Specific skills are the second dimension of human capital. They are technology related
and are measured in terms of productivity. They can be interpreted as competences and the
experience a worker has collected while working with a certain production technology. The
underlying assumption of learning-by-doing is thereby supported by empirical evidences.
Bahk and Gort (1993), e.g., found a significant effect of learning-by-doing on output of 15
industries, where the learning appeared to be uniquely related to embodied technological
change of physical capital.
The learning process and hence the speed of acquiring specific skills is assumed to be
depending on the general skill level of the worker. Suppose the machines used by h’s employer
i at time t have an average productivity of Ait, then the specific skills of worker h evolve
according to
bht+1 = bht + χ(b
gen
h ) ·max[0, Ait − bht]. (1)
The function χ is thereby increasing in bgen. Note that we assume that the generation of
new technologies is a cumulative process. This implies that specific skills are transferable
between vintages, even from old to new technologies. Furthermore, we assume that general
skills are observable by firms in the hiring process while specific skills are not. But specific
skills become observable ex post during the production process.
The accumulation of human capital within firms and the allocation of human capital
among firms is modeled in an explicit microfounded way. As the productivity of workers is
determined through learning-by-doing, the model shares a common feature with the strand
of learning-by-doing models in the endogenous growth literature. However, the learning
takes place at the individual level, i.e. single workers build up skills for the technology they
are currently using at the workplace. Since workers can switch jobs via an explicitly modeled
labor market, the knowledge transfer between firms in form of spillovers is endogenized and
takes place at the disaggregated firm level. This goes beyond the assumption of endogenous
growth models that assume perfectly externalized knowledge spillovers (e.g., Stadler, 1990).
3.4 The Consumption Goods Firm
3.4.1 Production Planning
Consumption good firms use labor and physical capital as input factors in the production
process. The capital stock of a firm is composed of different vintages of the capital good.
It depreciates over time and increases through investments such that the accumulation of
capital of a vintage v follows the law of motion
Kvit = (1− δ) ·Kvit−1 + Ivit. (2)
The parameter δ is the depreciation rate and Ivit is the investment in vintage v. Technology
is embodied in the capital stock and characterized by vintage specific productivity levels Av.
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The production technology is represented by a Leontief production function such that
labor and capital are used in a complementary way. Moreover, there is a complementarity
between the productivity of a vintage v and the average specific skills level Bit of the
workforce of the firm. This implies that a vintage cannot be used at its full productivity as
long as the workers have not acquired a sufficient level of specific skills.
Given the capital stock and the number of workers Lit, the produced output can be
computed according to the production function
Qit =
Vt∑
v=1
min
[
Kvit,max
[
0, Lit −
Vt∑
k=v+1
Kkit
]]
·min [Av, Bit] . (3)
The output Qit is sent to the mall where it is added to the inventory stock and supplied
to households.
The demand for the product of a firm is stochastic. In the Management science literature
there are standard heuristics for production planning problems facing stochastic demand.
A simple heuristic prescribes to generate an estimation of the distribution of demand and
to supply a quantity that is sufficient to fully serve the emerging demand at a probability
χS . The converse probability 1 − χS is then the stock-out probability (which is influenced
by stock-out costs, inventory costs and the risk attitude of the firm, e.g., Silver et al., 1998).
The target supply is determined by the expected value of the demand Dˆ and a buffer Ψˆ that
depends on the expected volatility of the demand σ2D and the accepted stock-out probability
1− χS . Assuming a normally distributed demand, the buffer is determined according to
Ψˆit = Dˆit · qχS ·
√
σ2D, (4)
where qχS is the χ
S-quantile of the normal distribution; σ2D and χ
S are exogenous model
parameters.
The planned output is then the difference of that target supply and the current inventory
stock at the mall Sit−1. However, the output is limited by Q¯, which is the feasible output
that can at most be produced with the current capital stock. Altogether, the planned output
is
Q˜it = min
[
Q¯it, Dˆit + Ψit − Sit−1
]
. (5)
3.4.2 Demand Estimation
The demand expectation Dˆ is derived from an estimation procedure that aims at devising a
closed form expression translating observed and unobserved but estimated determinants of
demand into an expected value. The derivation of this demand function is decomposed in two
steps. The first step describes an estimation of the overall development of the consumption
goods market represented by the growth of the market size. The market size is given by the
overall budget of households disposed for consumption. We assume that firms can ex post
observe the aggregated consumption budget. They use previous realizations to predict the
market development by estimating an expected growth rate gˆ.
In the second step of the procedure, the firm estimates how much of the total demand
is allocated it. More precisely, the firm estimates the choice probability of a representative
consumer regarding its product and uses this probability as a proxy for its market share. The
estimation is based on simulated purchase surveys for which the firm draws a representative
sample of households. Then, it presents all households a set of different goods at different
prices and asks the participating households to simulate their purchase decision on this set
of goods. Based on the outcome of this simulation, the firm estimates a discrete choice
model that incorporates the prices of the presented goods as an explicit determinant for the
purchasing decision. As a result, the firm obtains an estimator for the price sensitivity of
households, which can then be plugged in a discrete choice model incorporating the actual
range of goods provided at the consumption goods market. By using (expectations of) the
prices of its competitors, the firm can compute its expected market share from the choice
model.
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3.4.3 Pricing
The estimated demand Dˆ depends on the price that is set before the firm decides the
production plan. The price setting of consumption goods firms is based on an elaborate
analysis of potential profits. Therefore, the firm defines a set of candidate prices P˜ that is
drawn from an interval around its previous price pit−1. Based on the demand estimation,
the firm estimates revenues and costs for the upcoming production cycle associated with
each candidate price and selects that price with the highest potential profits. Thus, the firm
seeks the profit maximizing price taking into account the trade-off between price, sales and
costs.
After the determination of the price and the target output, the firm determines the labor
demand and the financial needs. The production plan might induce the need to hire new
labor or to obtain additional credits, where there is the possibility that firms are rationed
on the labor or credit market. In both cases, output and prices are adjusted accordingly.
3.4.4 Investment Decision
Disconnected from the production planning is the capital investment decision, which is taken
before the firm enters the production planning. In the financial planning, however, both,
the production plan and the investment plan, are considered and, in case of credit rationing,
the investment is revised and adjusted first.
The investment decision is based on an appraisal of whether long-term capital invest-
ments are worth the funding of cash. That means the firm evaluates the different investment
options systematically by checking whether an investment is potentially profitable over a
planning horizon.
Firms can purchase different vintages of the capital good at the capital goods market
that are distinguished by their embodied productivity and the market price. For this reason,
the investment decision is not only to decide on the quantity but also in which vintage of the
capital good the firm should invest. This endogenous vintage choice allows incorporating
an aspect that has yet received less attention in the integrated business cycles and growth
literature, the process of technological diffusion. While technological shocks are the main
source of fluctuations in several models of the RBC, New Keynesian and endogenous growth
literature, Blanchard (2008) argues that technological progress is a smooth process as it is
about the diffusion and implementation of new ideas. Comin (2009) shows in a theoretical
framework that the diffusion process amplifies the business cycle and that temporary fluc-
tuations in the intensity of adoption will have persistent effects on the productivity. Our
model accounts for a possible propagation mechanism through technological diffusion.
We assume that the decision-making is a three step process. In the first step, the firm
appraises different investment strategies and preselects the most profitable one. Therefore,
it computes the net present value of the candidate strategies over a planning horizon of
length TLT , where the firm has to form expectations on the development of the market,
the prices of competitors and its own cost structure over the planning horizon. Given the
required expenditures for the best strategy and the current financial situation, the firm
checks in the second step whether it has to raise additional credits to finance the project. If
external financing is needed, the firm assesses the impact on its financial stability. If it turns
out that the investment risks the financial standing, then the project is abandoned. The
third step takes account of the fact that timing of investments can also matter. A capital
investment is an opportunity that can either be executed today or postponed to a later date.
But, due to its irreversibility, once it has been committed it cannot be recovered. In those
cases, deferring can yield additional value because the economic environment can change
in the meantime and so might the estimated value when reevaluating the project after the
arrival of new information. If a project is postponed and later it turns out that the value
has not changed or has even increased, the firm has still the opportunity to carry out the
investment. But if it turns out to be a poor investment, the deferring strategy has preserved
the firm to make possible losses. However, by waiting and not carrying out the investment
immediately, the firm can also make losses in the form of foregone profits. The value of the
waiting option is thereby determined by applying a capital a budgeting model based on the
real option approach as described by Benaroch and Kauffman (1999). The investment is
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finally executed if the forgone expected profits exceed the additional value of waiting.
3.5 Technological Change
Technological change is modeled in form of embodied technological change as described
e.g. by Greenwood et al. (1997). The quality of capital goods is permanently improved
through innovations. Productivity gains can be achieved by using capital for production
whose productivity is higher than the productivity of the pre-existing capital stock. But
due to the inertia of the complementary specific skills, purchasing better capital does not
immediately lead to productivity gains (see Section 3.3).
Since the focus of our analysis lies on the interactions of the dynamics of labor and
consumption goods markets, the capital good sector is modeled in a simplified stylized way.
There is a monopolistic capital goods producer that supplies different vintages of the capital
good. A vintage v is characterized by its productivity Av and supplied at infinite supply at
a price pvIt.
The capital good can be produced and delivered immediately without input factor re-
quirements and consequently without production costs. In order to close the model the
revenues are channeled back into the economy by distributing them to households as divi-
dends.
The development of new vintages with an improved quality is assumed to be a stochastic
process. At the beginning of month t, the development of a new vintage is accomplished at an
exogenously given and memoryless probability probInno. In case of a successful innovation,
the new vintage becomes the best practice technology where its productivity AV increases
compared to the former best practice AV−1 by
AV = (1 + ∆qinv) ·AV−1, (6)
with being ∆qinv exogenously given and ∆qinv > 0.
The pricing of the vintages is modeled as a combination of cost-based and value-based
pricing. Although there are no actual costs in the production process of capital goods, we
assume as-if costs that the capital goods firm takes into account. The production of a unit
of the capital good, regardless of which vintage, is associated with unit costs cCt . To account
for the cost dynamics, we assume that the main factor of production costs is the wage bill.
Since wages increase approximately with the same rate as productivity grows, the growth
rate of productivity is used as a proxy for the increase in production costs of the capital
goods.
Furthermore, we assume that the capital goods firm can observe certain characteristics of
its customers and it has certain knowledge of how clients decide on the investment. Moreover,
it receives the same market signals as consumption goods firms such that it can estimate the
development of the consumption goods market. The capital goods firm uses this information
to estimate the average value V vt of one unit of each vintage v for a reference firm whose
characteristics, i.e. the set of variables as mean specific skills, average wage etc., match
the observed average values of capital good firm’s recent clients. Therefore, it computes the
present value of additional profits that the reference firm could generate if its capital stock is
expanded by one unit of vintage v. The additional profit is thereby estimated by an analogue
procedure as the consumption goods producer’s pre-selection of investment strategies.
As a general rule, the price is set at the level corresponding to the estimated value of
the vintage. This follows from the assumption that the capital goods firm interprets the
value V vt as costumers’ average willingness to pay. There is, however, one exception for
which the firm deviates from this rule. It occurs when the value V vt is below the cost level
cCt . In this case, the vintage is not offered in t. It might be the case that all values of the
vintages are below cCt , though. Then, only the best practice technology is supplied at a
price corresponding to the unit costs cCt .
Altogether, we can write the price setting rule as
pvIt =

0, if v < vˇ and V vt < c
C
t ,
V vt , if v ≤ vˇ and V vt ≥ cCt ,
cCt , if v = vˇ and V
v
t < c
C
t ,
(7)
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where vˇ denotes the best practice technology.
There are two implications of this price setting rule. First, the capital goods firm realizes
that out of date vintages, i.e. those vintages with productivity significantly below the
average productivity of costumers’ capital stock and workforce, do not have any value for
its clients. Consequently, those vintages are withdrawn from the market. Second, capital
goods prices react to changes of expectations of consumption goods firms concerning the
market performance. As a consequence, prices might be higher in prospering and lower in
economically bad times.
3.6 Labor Market Interaction
Based on the planned output and the available financial resources, consumption goods pro-
ducers determine the labor demand L˜it for the current production cycle t. If the workforce
employed at the beginning of t is not sufficient to cover the required labor demand, firms
enter the labor market in order to recruit new employees. Therefore, they post vacancies
that can be read by job searchers.
The wage offer plays an important role in the hiring process. In an ideal world firms
would pay workers an individual wage that perfectly matches the productivity level of each
worker. But as the productivity of applicants is assumed to be unobservable, they cannot
directly link the wage to the individual productivity. What firms can, however, observe is
the general skill level of applicants. Furthermore, they can monitor the productivity of the
incumbent workforce in total and the averages for the two general skill groups separately.
By interpreting the general skill level g as a signal for the productivity, firms expect the
specific skills of applicants to be at the average level B¯igt−1 of incumbent workers belonging
to the same skill group as the applicants do. For each general skill group g, firms post a
separate wage offer wOigt that is determined according to
wOigt = w
base
it ·min[Ait, B¯igt−1]. (8)
The first factor wbaseit of the right-hand site represents a market driven base wage offer
that is paid per unit of specific skills. The second factor is the effective productivity that
a new worker is expected to yield. Effective productivity means that, due to the assumed
complementarity, high specific skills cannot be fully utilized if the capital stock does not have
a sufficient productivity, i.e. Ait ≥ B¯igt−1. In those cases, firms are unwilling to pay wages
that correspond to their actual labor productivity and limit the wage offers accordingly.
Unemployed workers accept only those job offers whose salary exceeds a reservation wage
wRht. When becoming unemployed, the reservation wage is set at the level of the last earned
wage and, as long as the household cannot find a new job, it declines over time by
wRht+1 = (1− ψ) · wRht. (9)
Note that the reservation wage cannot fall below the level of unemployment benefits, which
itself is a fraction u of the last labor income.
The labor market interaction between households and firms is described by a simple
two-round search-and-matching algorithm. In the first step, firms post vacancy notifications
that can be read by unemployed households. Job seekers consider the posted wages wOigt for
the skill group they belong to and send applications for those jobs whose wage offers exceed
the reservation wage. The number of applications per workers is thereby limited. In the next
step, firms collect all applications and decide based on a logit discrete choice model which
applicants to send a job offer. A parameter γgenof the logit model specifies the weight that
general skills have in the decision process. Finally, households getting one or more job offers
become re-employed, where households with more than one offer accept that one associated
with the highest wage and reject the others. Thus, it is not ensured that firms can fill all
vacancies. At the same time, there might also be households that have not received any job
offers.
Both, rationed firms and households, have a second opportunity to be matched in a
second round of the labor market procedure. Before reentering the labor market, the rationed
firms increase their base wage offer wbaseit by
wbaseit = (1 + ϕ) · wbaseit . (10)
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This should account for the fact that firms that have failed to fill vacancies try to attract
new workers by raising their wages.
In the opposite case, when the labor demand is lower than the number of workers em-
ployed at the beginning of t, firms have to make redundancies. They expect that high-skilled
workers have either higher specific skills or, at least, are capable of learning faster while work-
ing with more productive technologies. Therefore, firms dismiss workers with low general
skills first. Additionally, there is a small probability for each worker-employer match to be
separated in each period. This should capture job separation due to reasons not explicitly
captured in the model.
Not only the wage of new workers but also the wage of the incumbent workforce is linked
to the productivity. By assuming that the wage keeps pace with the productivity growth in
the economy, the individual wage of a worker h changes according to
wht = (1 + prt−1) · wht−1, (11)
where prt−1 is the average productivity growth achieved in the previous period t− 1.
3.7 Consumption Market Interaction
There is a considerable degree of uncertainty regarding the household’s monthly income
stemming from two sources. The first source is the labor income that can rapidly change by
being fired or hired. The second source of uncertainty is the capital income that depends
on fluctuating dividend payments of firms. For a saving and consumption decision with
uncertain income, a strand of the consumption theory literature describes models with buffer
stock saving in which households undertake precautionary saving in order to preserve them
against bad future incomes. This theory is also supported by empirical evidences (e.g.,
Deaton, 1991; Carroll and Summers, 1991).
For determining the consumption budget, households apply a linear approximation of
an optimal buffer stock saving rule as described in Allen and Carrol (2001). The desired
buffer stock depends on the current income and is determined by a target ration Φ of
wealth to income. As long as the actual wealth matches the desired buffer, a household
would completely spend the monthly income for consumption. In case the actual size of the
wealth deviates from the planned buffer, the household reacts by increasing or decreasing
the monthly consumption budget relative to the income, depending on the deviation of the
wealth from its target. A parameter κ indicates how sensitive the consumption reacts on
the deviation. The rule can be written as
Cexpht = Iht + κ(Wht − ΦIht), (12)
where Iht is the monthly income consisting of labor or unemployment benefits, respectively,
as well as dividend payments. Wht is the wealth consisting of money holdings and asset
wealth in shares.
The consumption goods market is represented by a central outlet mall in which con-
sumption goods producers offer and sell their goods to households. Households visit this
outlet mall once a week and try to spend the entire weekly budget for one good. The days
at which they go to the mall are randomly distributed among households. The customers
can observe the prices but they do not get information about the available quantities. The
purchasing decision of households is described using a logit model as suggested in the Mar-
keting literature (e.g., Malhotra, 1984). The relative price of goods is an important factor
influencing the outcome of the decision, where the intensity of choice with respect to the
prices is set by a parameter γC .
Since firms have inflexible production cycles they can refill the mall inventories only once
per month. Furthermore, the individual delivery dates of firms are asynchronized. Thus,
the supply is strictly limited by available inventory stocks and, since the households have
no information on the inventories, there is the possibility to be rationed. In this case, the
mall sets a rationing quota corresponding to the percentage of the total demand that can be
satisfied with the available goods and each household gets the indicated percentage of the
requested consumption. Rationed households have a second chance to spend the remaining
budget for another good.
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3.8 Parametrization and Initialization
The model hosts a considerable number of parameters. In order to determine a parametriza-
tion for the simulations, we follow an approach that combines a direct estimation of param-
eters for which empirical observations are available with an indirect calibration approach.
Calibration means we use the degrees of freedom stemming from parameters without empir-
ical counterparts to tweak the model in such a way that it generates economically accurate
simulation outcomes. This facilitates the ability of the model to capture economic mecha-
nisms which are relevant for real world economic dynamics. Table 1 provides an overview
of the standard constellation of model parameters obtained from the empirically grounded
calibration procedure. Table 2 shows the set-up of the model regarding the number of agents
of each type, the general skill distribution among households and the adjustment speed of
specific skills for the general skill groups. Both tables can be found in A.
Technological change is one of the main drivers of long-term economic growth, where
the technological development is mainly determined by the growth of the technological
frontier and the diffusion of technologies. To avoid spurious growth effects stemming from
stochastic differences in the dynamic of the technological frontier between runs, we use in all
considered runs an identical realization of the stochastic process governing the emergence of
new vintages.
Agent based models are typically characterized by strong path dependencies. Thus,
the initial state of the system, which is an exogenous input to the simulation, can have
considerable effects on the simulation output. This makes the choice of the initial state to a
crucial one. In general, there are several conditions that constrain the initialization of agents’
state variables. First and foremost, the initial values of the variables should be plausible in
order to avoid odd initial states generating economically unreasonable simulation outcomes.
Second, we have to consider several interdependencies of variables. Especially with respect
to the balance sheet of agents, we have to initialize the variables according to the criterion
of stock-flow consistency. If the balance sheets are inconsistent from the start, they would
remain so throughout the entire simulation. Thus, we are constrained to set the initial values
in such a way that the balance sheet relationships between agents hold (a deeper discussion
of these constraints can be found in Dawid et al., 2012b).
We set up the model such that the agents are initially homogeneous with respect to most
characteristics. Firms have identical assets (a capital stock of the same size and quality, and
the same amount of liquidity) and liabilities, and there are no established worker-employer
matches. Households own the same wealth and are endowed with the same specific skills.
Distributions of these variables among agents evolve endogenously over the simulation. One
exception are the general skills of households, which are heterogeneous from the start and
distributed according to the distribution reported in Table 2.
It should be clear that any initialization has invariably transient effects but these tran-
sient effects level off with elapsing simulation time. In order to alleviate that those transient
effects distort the policy experiments, we use a start state of the economy for the simulations
which is already settled. To obtain this initial condition, we have run a pre-simulation based
on the initial state described above and chosen a post-transient snapshot of this simulation
as the initialization for the simulations.
3.9 Business Cycle Properties and Stylized Facts
A standard approach to build confidence in agent-based models is the empirical validation.
In this procedure, one compares data from the model data-generation process (DGP) with
empirical data, which can be interpreted as the unique outcome of an unknown real-world
data-generation process. If the simplified model DGP replicates a selected set of stylized
facts of the empirical data, then the model DGP can be considered as a sufficiently good
representation of the real-world DGP (cf. Fagiolo et al., 2007).
In the following, we present some properties of a representative simulation outcome from
the model DGP based on the default parametrization and relate them to stylized facts from
the literature. Our focus is on the model’s ability to generate endogenous business cycles
with realistic properties, which can be seen as a strong evidence for the model’s applicability
to consider business cycle policies.
13
0 100 200 300 400 500
7.
8
7.
9
8.
0
8.
1
8.
2
8.
3
8.
4
Months
Lo
g 
O
ut
pu
t
0 100 200 300 400 500
−
0.
04
−
0.
02
0.
00
0.
02
0.
04
0.
06
0.
08
0.
10
Months
An
nu
a
l G
ro
w
th
 R
at
e
(a) (b)
0 100 200 300 400 500
−
0.
02
−
0.
01
0.
00
0.
01
0.
02
0.
03
0.
04
0.
05
Months
An
nu
a
l I
nf
la
tio
n
0 100 200 300 400 500
4
6
8
10
12
14
Months
Un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t R
at
e
(c) (d)
Figure 1: Time series of (log) output (a), annual growth rate (b), annual inflation rate (c),
and unemployment rate (d).
Figure 1 shows the main macro variables output, annual output growth rates, inflation
and unemployment rate. Panel (a) and (b) illustrate that the model generates endogenous
business cycles. Output dynamics are characterized by persistent fluctuations and persistent
growth, i.e. there is a business cycle component around a positive output trend. The long-
term annual growth rate is 1.6% while the growth rate deviates over the business cycle
considerably from its long-term average.
The volatility of the business cycle can be measured by computing the percentage stan-
dard deviation of the cyclical component. In order to extract the cyclical component, the
time series can be detrended by means of the HP filter with λ = 1600, which is a standard
choice for a business cycle analysis of quarterly data (e.g., Hodrick and Prescott, 1997). The
relative standard deviation is 1.54%, which is close to empirically reported values. Sorensen
and Whitta-Jacobsen (2005), for example, report a volatility of 1.66% for the U.S. business
cycle between 1955 and 2001.
High persistence is a further empirical regularity of the business cycle. Persistence de-
scribes the dependency of the level of output in period t from its previous realizations and
is typically measured by the one-quarter auto-correlation. The auto-correlation coefficient
of the cyclical component of output is 0.9, which implies that the business cycle is highly
persistent. This observation is also in accordance with empirical observations; Sorensen and
Whitta-Jacobsen (2005), e.g., report a value of 0.86 for the U.S. economy.
The average length of the detected business cycles is about 21 quarters (corresponding
to 5.25 years) with a minimum length of 17 quarters and a maximum of 24 quarters. This is
within the range of 6 to 32 quarters, which is customarily used for defining business cycles in
the empirical literature (e.g., Baxter and King, 1999). Moreover, Figure 1 shows a persistent
inflation, fluctuating in a corridor between -0.5 and 4% with a mean of 1.8% (panel c). Also
the unemployment rate fluctuates, where its range is between 5.5 and 11.2% with a mean
of 7.8% (panel d).
The empirical business cycle literature examines the relationship between the aggregate
business cycle and various other macroeconomic variables, such as prices, wages, employ-
ment, productivity, investment, and consumption. A broader discussion of business cy-
cle properties of 71 U.S. economic time series can be found in Stock and Watson (1999).
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Figure 2: The Beveridge curve approximated by means of a log-linear regression.
Harting (2014) demonstrates for a wide range of variables that the model reproduces the
co-movement behavior as described in Stock and Watson (1999): Harting (2014) finds,
e.g., pro-cyclical co-movement of consumption, investments, employment, and productivity;
counter-cyclical co-movement of prices, wages, and mark-ups. The countercyclical behavior
of mark-ups is thereby a particularly interesting feature of the model as, in contrast to most
standard macroeconomic models, mark-ups are here determined endogenously at the firm
level. It has been argued by Blanchard (2008) that, indeed, there is empirical indication
of countercyclical mark-ups and that it is a wide open macroeconomic research question to
provide sound theoretical explanations for the movement of mark-ups along the business
cycle (see also Bils and Chang, 2000).
Besides the properties of the business cycle, the model can also replicate other stylized
facts reported in the literature. Regarding labor market regularities, the relation between
the unemployment rate and the vacancies rate is typically shown in the Beveridge curve,
where the literature reports a negative correlation between unemployment rates and the
vacancy rates (e.g., Blanchard et al., 1989). Figure 2 shows the Beveridge curve generated
from the benchmark simulation, which is clearly downward sloping. In fact, the model
generates a negative relation between unemployment and vacancies.
The empirical literature on firm size distributions reports a tendency of firm size distri-
butions to be right-skewed with upper tails made of few large firms (e.g., Dosi et al., 2006).
Panel (a) of Figure 3 shows the simulated firm size distribution in a Log Rank vs. Log
Size plot, where output is used as a proxy for firm size. The actual firm size distribution is
represented by circles while the solid line shows the log-normal distribution with the sam-
ple mean and standard deviation as distribution parameters. The plot indicates that the
firm size distribution is close to the log-normal distribution so that it is characterized by a
considerable right-skewness. It should be noted that the firm size distribution in panel (a)
is based on a snapshot of the simulation at month 250; in panel (b) we present a heat map
depicting the evolution of the firm size distribution over time. The color code indicates
the density of the output distribution. This panel illustrates that the right-skewness of the
distribution is persistent.
Lumpiness of investments at the firm level is a frequently reported regularity for the
capital accumulation (see Dosi et al., 2006). Based on U.S. plant level data, Doms and
Dunne (1998) show that 51.9% of plants expand their capital stock by less than 2.5% in a
year, while 11% of plants increase their capital stock by more than 20% within the same
time interval. In the benchmark simulation, 59% of firms invest less than 2.5% within a
given year, while 7% of firms increase their capital stock by more than 20%. However, these
7% contribute significantly to the aggregated investment as they account for 20% of the
total investments. At the other end of the distribution, the 59% of firms, which increase the
capital stocks by less than 2.5%, contribute to about 22% of the overall investment. This
suggests that, in accordance with empirical evidences, the investment behavior of firms in
the model is characterized by a considerable lumpiness.
Finally, the emerging productivity dynamics of firms show some characteristics which
are widely described in the literature (see again Dosi et al., 2006). Figure 4 (a) depicts
the evolution of the productivity distribution over time where productivity is measured as
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Figure 3: Firm size distribution; Log Rank vs. Log Size plot of firm output (a) and evolution
of output distribution (b). The color code indicates the density of the population distribution
in the considered range of the variable output.
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Figure 4: Evolution of the productivity distribution (a) and evolution of average productivity
of firms that are low-productive (red) and high-productive (black) at t = 100 (b).
the productivity of the utilized capital stock. Besides the general increase of the average
productivity due to technological progress, this figure indicates that there is considerable
productivity dispersion among firms and the distribution, as that of firm sizes, tends to
be right-skewed. Panel (b) indicates a high persistence of productivity differentials between
firms, which is a further empirical regularity reported by Dosi et al. (2006). The panel shows
the evolution of the average productivity of two subgroups of firms, which belong either to
the lower 50% quantile (red line) or to the upper 50% quantile (black line) of the technology
distribution at months 100. Evidently, there is only little technological catch up of the
lagging firms. Firms that have belonged to the group of low-tech firms in an early phase of
the simulation show a high probability to remain low-tech throughout the simulation.
4 The Policy Analysis
4.1 Policy Design
In this section we employ the model for policy experiments in which we investigate the
effectiveness of different fiscal policy measures that aim at smoothing the business cycle
volatility. The policies analyzed in the experiments are stylized instances of policies that
have actually been used by the U.S. government during the Great Recession. In the Economic
Stimulus Act of 2008, the U.S. administration of President George W. Bush put together a
stabilizing program that consisted of basically three main packages.1 The largest package
contained a $100 billion tax rebate program for households. Estimates show that these tax
rebates led to a stimulus of aggregate demand of 0.5 to 1.0% in the second quarter of 2008
1see, e.g., http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/background/stimulus/2008.cfm (accessed
on February, 9th, 2015).
16
and 0.16 to 1.81% in the third quarter of 2008 (see Broda and Parker, 2012). The other two
packages contained business provisions that aimed at encouraging investments by increased
limits on expensing investment costs and accelerated depreciation for some investments.
According to estimations of the U.S. Congress, the investment enhancing policy reduced the
tax revenue by $51 billion in fiscal 2008 and 2009. Since the claims for depreciation were only
brought forward, tax revenues have risen by $43.5 billion in the subsequent years; but the
net effect might still be $7.5 billion. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
was signed into law by President Barack Obama as a follow up program of the Economic
Stimulus Act. This package had a total size of $900 billion and provided also tax cuts ($275
billion) and increased existing programs. But in contrast to its predecessor, some of the
measures contained in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act had a strong focus on
encouraging the technological advance of the U.S. economy.2 Besides expending $15 billion
directly for scientific facilities and research, it provided over $30 billion for investments
in renewable energy and smart grid power networks as well as $7 billion for expanding
broadband internet access. This government money was designated to flow to both, the
private sector and directly to federal, state, and local government.
Altogether, the different policy measures of the two packages can be summarized un-
der three distinct policy categories; demand subsidization, investment subsidization, and
technology subsidization. We mimic these policies in a highly stylized way and try to ad-
dress the two following research questions: Are these three policies actually able to smooth
the business cycle? And do the policies have long-term effects on the growth path of the
economy?
We abstract from problems associated with time lags in detecting recessions and imple-
menting policies as well as from issues of the political economy. The stabilization policies
are automatically introduced and adjusted when there is a risk of the economy to plunge
into an economic crisis. Therefore, we define a threshold growth rate gth at which the pol-
icy is automatically installed if the quarterly growth rate gQt−1 of the last period is below
this threshold.3 In order to achieve the stabilizing effect, the expansion of the policies are
adjusted depending on the deviation of the last-period growth rate from the threshold.
The first considered policy is a classical demand-oriented Keynesian stimulus. The ag-
gregate demand is increased by stimulating consumption through a direct subsidization of
households. When the quarterly growth rate is below the critical growth rate, all house-
holds receive a subsidy, where the individual subsidy is a percentage sHHt of the household’s
consumption expenditures. As pointed out above, we assume that the subsidy rate sHHt
increases with the gap between the actual and the threshold growth rate. Thus, the larger
the deviation of the growth rate from gth, the more subsidies are paid out to households.
The size of the subsidy rate is determined according to the following equation:
sHHt = µ · tanh
(
max
[
0, gth − gQt−1
])
. (13)
Besides the deviation of the quarterly growth rate from the threshold gth, the size of the
subsidy rate depends on an exogenous parameter µ. This parameter is used to control the
intensity of the policy.
We assume that households know the conditions of the policy ex ante and take the subsidy
as additional budget into account when deciding about consumption plans. However, it is not
possible to retain and save the subsidies. Households have to spend subsidies immediately.
The second policy is a subsidization of firms’ capital investments. When the policy is
implemented, all investing firms receive a fraction sInvt of their investment expenditures
as subsidies. Again, we assume that firms know the conditions of the policy ex ante and
incorporate the subsidy in their investment decision by taking a reduced capital price into
account. The subsidy percentage sInvt is determined according to the same rule as described
in Expression 13.
Also the third policy scenario considers an investment subsidization, but in contrast to
the second policy, firms only receive subsidies if they choose the currently available best
2see, e.g., http://www.recovery.gov/Pages/default.aspx (accessed on February, 9th, 2015)
3The target growth rate is set such that it corresponds to the average growth rate of the technological
frontier, which can be interpreted as the natural growth potential of the economy. The frontier grows at an
annual rate of about 2%. Thus, the threshold value at which the policy is activated is gth = 0.005.
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Figure 5: Spline smoothed effects of the consumption subsidy policy (a), investment subsidy
policy (b), and technology subsidy policy (c) on the volatility of the business cycle.
practice technology for their investment. As for the other policies, the subsidy rate sTecht is
determined according to Equation 13.
We set up simulations in which we vary the intensity parameter µ incrementally by steps
of size 0.25 within an interval between null (i.e. no policy) and a maximum level µmax. This
enables us to examine a quasi-continuation of policy effects and allows a better analysis
and comparison of the three policies. Note that the maximum intensity is different for each
policy. The values are chosen such that a further increase does not lead to a significant
reduction of business cycle volatility. We have µmax = 12.0 for the consumption policy,
µmax = 28.0 for the investment policy, and µmax = 20.0 for the technology policy. In order
to obtain statistically robust results, we run 12 batch runs for each of the considered values
of µ.
4.2 Policy Effects on the Business Cycle Volatility
We now turn to the comparison of the three stabilization policies. The first policy question
posed in Section 4.1 has been whether the policies are actually able to smooth the business
cycle. A possible indicator for measuring business cycle volatility is the percentage standard
deviation computed for the cyclical component of the time series total output from its HP
filtered trend (see Section 3.9).
Figure 5 shows the estimated effects of a variation of the policy intensity µ on this
volatility measure (see B for technical details). The three panels demonstrate that each of
the considered policies can reduce the business cycle volatility. In that sense, the policies
are suitable to achieve the primary goal for which they have been designed. The effects
show qualitatively similar patterns. The estimated curves describing the relation between
volatility and the intensity of the policies are convex. Thus, the policies are characterized
by diminishing returns with respect to the intensity parameter µ. Apparently, there seems
to be a minimum level of volatility for each policy. The lower bounds are almost identical
for the consumption and the investment subsidy policy while the minimum volatility of the
technology policy is considerably higher.
It should be clear that a comparison of the policies based on Figure 5 cannot account for
input efficiency. The reason is that the intensity parameter µ is used in different contexts
such that equal values of µ are associated with different levels of additional government
spending. To make the policies comparable in this respect, one has to replace µ by, e.g., an
indicator measuring the average policy expenditures. In Figure 6 we show the re-estimated
policy effects where we use the average monthly spending relative to the nominal GDP as
input measures of the policies. Now one can see a clear difference between the three policies.
For obtaining the same volatility reduction, the government must spend a considerable
larger share of the GDP for the demand stimulating policy compared to the investment
stimulating policy. And the technology subsidy, which cannot reach the same volatility
reduction, requires the lowest expenditures. A further observation is that the presumption
of diminishing returns still holds. Altogether, these observations lead to the first qualitative
insight:
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Figure 6: Estimated relation between business cycle volatility and policy expenditures per
GDP (averaged over all periods) for the consumption subsidy policy (a), investment subsidy
policy (b), and technology subsidy policy (c).
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Figure 7: Left: Spline smoothed policy effect of a variation of the policy intensity µ on the
average annual growth rate over the 500 simulation months; right: the policy effect on the
time series of aggregated output. The color code indicates the time evolution of changes in
total output relative to the baseline case without policy.
Result 1: All three policies lead to a substantial reduction of the business cycle volatility.
However, the policies differ considerably in terms of their efficiency regarding the usage of
fiscal resources. To obtain a similar volatility reduction, the government has to spend most
funds for the consumption stimulating policy, while it has to spend considerably less for the
investment and the least funds for the technology subsidizing policy.
4.3 Policy Effects on Long-term Growth
4.3.1 The Consumption Stimulating Policy
We now turn to the long-term growth effect of the three policies starting with the consump-
tion subsidization. Figure 7 (a) shows for the considered range of the policy intensity µ the
annual real growth rate of the economy, averaged over the 500 months of the simulations.
The policy effect on economic growth tends to be positive and its strength increases with µ.
Without policy, the average annual growth rate is about 1.6% and rises up to approximately
1.68% for the highest considered intensity µ = 12.0.
In order to determine whether the growth effect is transient or permanent, – the former
means a shift of the output trajectory and the latter a shift of the growth trajectory – we
depict in panel (b) of Figure 7 the estimated relative effect on the time series of aggregated
output. The heat map displays the time dimension in quarters at the horizontal axis and
the different levels of policy intensity µ at the vertical axis. The color code indicates the
relative deviation of total output from the baseline case without policy (see B for technical
details). Apparently, the growth of the output premium is not constant over time. This
observation, however, contradicts the hypothesis of a possible uniform shift of the growth
trajectory.
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Figure 8: Policy effect on the nominal consumption budget (a), the deflated consumption
budget (b), planned output quantities (c) and average productivity of the capital stock (d).
The policy is a classical demand-oriented policy measure that aims at supporting the
economy through a stimulation of private consumption. A higher consumption level is sup-
posed to increase firms’ production, which prevents the economy from sliding into recession.
The reduction of the business cycle volatility described above suggests that this mechanism
actually works. But the policy leads not only to temporary effects on the consumption bud-
get but also to a permanent effect. This can be seen in panel (a) of Figure 8 showing the
overall effect of the policy on the households’ consumption budget, which is clearly positive
and steadily increasing over time. Adjusting for inflation uncovers the policy effect on the
real consumption budget (panel b). Again, the effect is positive throughout the simulation
but its size is smaller compared to the nominal effect. This suggests that the policy leads
to increasing inflation.
In addition to the direct effect of the subsidies, the sustained effect on the nominal budget
can mainly be explained by wage dynamics arising at a tightening labor market. Panel (c)
of Figure 8 shows a positive policy effect on the planned output quantities. Compared to
the actual output, it becomes apparent that firms cannot fully realize the desired production
plans. There is a production gap that is mostly due to rationing at the labor market. The
increasing demand at the consumption goods market leads to adjusted output targets, which
in turn requires an adjustment of firms’ work force. As a result, the employment level as
well as the labor market tension increases such that it becomes more difficult to fill open
vacancies. Hence, in order to attract workers, firms start increasing the wage competition,
which implies rising base wage offers. Eventually, this leads to a higher nominal wage level,
thereby contributing to the growing consumption budget. At the same time, as the wage
increase is disconnected from the development of the productivity in the economy, the unit
costs of firms increase as well. Since these additional costs are incorporated in the pricing of
firms, the rising costs lead to inflation and deflate the growth of the nominal consumption
budget.
Panel (d) presents the policy effect on the average productivity of capital in the economy.
There is a positive effect on the productivity of firms for high policy intensities in the long
run. The increasing productivity coincides the growing long-term output premium for high
policy intensities (compare Figure 7 b). This suggests that the positive long-term growth
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Figure 9: Policy effect on output levels of high-tech (a) and low-tech firms (b).
effect observed for high policy intensities is mostly technology-driven.
The emergence of this productivity fostering effect can be traced back to the fact that
firms are heterogeneous with respect to productivity and output, and these heterogeneous
firms are differently affected by the policy. To illustrate this connection, we depict in Figure 9
the evolution of the average output effect for high- and low-tech firms.4 In fact, high-
and low-tech firms respond differently to the policy, where three distinct phases can be
identified. In the short term, high-tech firms expand their production while at the same
time the output of low-tech firms slightly declines. This leads to an overall increase of
the output heterogeneity as high-tech firms produce on average more output than low-tech
firms. As time elapses, the positive effect on the output of high-tech firms ceases and becomes
negative, while at the same time low-tech firms increase their output. This is associated
with a reduction of the output heterogeneity of firms in the medium term. And finally, the
positive output effect on high-tech firms re-emerges in the long run. At the same time, the
effect on low-tech firms declines.
How can the different behavior of low- and high-tech firms be explained? To understand
the underlying mechanism, we first focus on what happens in the short term. The reason
why high-tech firms benefit almost exclusively from the policy in the short run is that these
firms start with a competitive advantage. At the outset, high-tech firms have (by definition)
a higher technological productivity as well as a superior human capital endowment. Both
translates into cost advantages that allow high-tech firms to set lower prices without substan-
tially impairing the price costs margin. This competitive advantage in turn gives high-tech
firms scope to respond more aggressively on the additional demand generated by the policy.
When the policy is introduced, high-tech firms make use of their higher competitiveness and
grab most of the additionally emerging demand.
The initial output expansion of high-tech firms comes along with a relative increase of
labor demand, which intensifies the competition on the labor market and drives the dynam-
ics of wage offers. This competitive pressure is mostly fueled by two generic phenomena
of the base scenario without policy; first, high- and low-tech firms differ in their relative
attractiveness for workers with different general skills, where high-tech firms offer competi-
tive wages only for high-skilled workers. And second, the unemployment rate of high-skilled
workers is substantially lower and high-skilled workers are almost exclusively employed by
high-tech firms. As a consequence, high-tech firms must aim at attracting low-skill workers
for open job positions. Since the wage offers for low-skilled workers are not competitive in
this period, high-tech firms have to adjust their wage offers by increasing the base wage
offer.
Rising base wage offers are associated with increasing wages that firms have to pay to
their employees. These wage increases are cost-relevant as they are disconnected from the
productivity growth and result in higher unit (labor) costs. As described above, base wage
offers between high- and low-tech firms are shifted towards high-tech firms with the conse-
quence that high-tech firms lose some of their cost advantages. At the same time, high-tech
4High-tech firms in period t are those firms whose productivity is above the median productivity in t.
Accordingly, low-tech firms are those firms with productivity below the median.
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Figure 10: Spline-smoothed policy effects of the investment subsidizing policy on quarterly
growth rates of output (a) and on the evolution of aggregated output.
firms have to set prices more aggressively in order to expand and sell the additionally pro-
duced output. Consequently, high-tech firms forfeit some of their relative profitability and
competitiveness over this period. Altogether, the observed phenomena reduce the compet-
itive pressure on low-tech firms and enable them, at a certain point in time, to choose a
more aggressive competitive strategy. This gives rise to a relative reduction of their prices
and a relative expansion of output quantities. As a consequence, we observe the transition
to the medium-term state of the economy, in which low-tech firms expand relative to the
base scenario, whereas high-tech firms lower their output.
The shift of the relative output towards low-tech firms in the medium run is associated
with an increasing labor demand of low-tech firms. In order to adjust the workforce, low-tech
firms start intensifying the wage competition such that the shift of the relative base wage
offer towards high-tech firms ceases. Eventually, this relative increase of labor demand ini-
tiates an inverse repetition of the mechanism described above, which now leads to a relative
loss of competitiveness of low-tech firms. This results in the emerging output divergence
between low- and high-tech firms in the long run. This divergence explains the increase
of the economy-wide productivity and finally the increasing aggregate output. Putting all
implications together, we can summarize the effectiveness of the consumption subsidizing
policy in the following qualitative insight:
Result 2: The consumption subsidizing policy has an amplifying effect on the long-
term growth in the economy and leads to more employment. At the same time, the policy
induces more inflation. The positive long-term growth effect for high policy intensities is
technology-driven by a faster diffusion of new technologies. This accelerated diffusion is the
result of different policy reactions of heterogeneous firms in the short run that, due to path
dependencies, lead to a relative expansion of high-tech firms in the long run.
4.3.2 The Investment Subsidy Policy
Quite a different picture emerges compared to our discussion in the previous subsection,
if we consider the implications of the investment subsidizing policy. Under this policy, a
firm receives a public subsidy when it invests in physical capital. The size of this subsidy
depends on the intensity of the policy µ and the deviation of the quarterly growth rate
from the threshold value gth. Firms take this subsidy into account when deciding about
investments.
Figure 6 on page 19 has indicated that the investment subsidizing policy can achieve the
same reduction of the business cycle volatility as the consumption policy. A comparison of
the growth effects, however, reveals a substantial difference between the two policies. While
the consumption subsidization has a positive growth effect, the investment policy has a
negative effect on the long-term growth rate (Figure 10 a). Furthermore, the growth effect
is not monotonic in µ; rather, the effect appears to be U-shaped with its strongest negative
impact for moderate levels of µ (between 5 and 15). In panel (b) we display the emerging
dynamics of the policy effect on the aggregate output trajectory. Apparently, the policy
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Figure 11: Policy effect on the aggregated level of planned output (a), nominal consumption
budget (b), posted vacancies (c) and average capital productivity (d).
generates not only a non-monotonic impact on the average growth rate but also highly
non-linear effects on the output trajectory. While there is virtually no effect in the first
two-thirds of the encompassed time, one can observe the emergence of a negative output
effect in the last third of the simulation. It is in any case worth noting that the emergence
of a negative policy effect depends not only on the intensity of the policy itself but also on
the considered time horizon.
The lack of additional aggregate output in the short term is thereby consistent with
the absence of any positive effect on the trajectory of the aggregated planned output (see
Figure 11 a). This is true even if the policy has a positive impact on the growth of the
consumption budget (panel b). The increase of the consumption budget is thereby driven
by labor market dynamics. Although there is no effect on planned and actual output in the
short term, one can observe a positive effect on the number of posted vacancies (panel c) and
the number of vacancies remaining unfilled. The higher labor demand leads to an increase
of wage offers and eventually of nominal wages. Since labor is the most important source of
income, rising nominal wages translate into rising consumption budgets. On the other hand,
the wage increase leads to higher unit costs of firms that are incorporated in the prices. As
a result, the additional growth of the consumption budget is offset by more inflation.
But why does the policy lead to a negative output effect in long run? The negative
output effect is mostly due to a strong convergence between high-and low-tech firms in the
long run. While catching up, low-tech firms account for most of the investments, thereby
systematically investing in less productive technologies. This results in a declining overall
productivity in the economy as illustrated in Figure 11 (d).
The output convergence between high- and low-tech firms in the long run is highlighted
in Figure 12, which depicts the policy effects on output separately for high- and low-tech
firms. Moreover, figure 12 reveals another observation: while there are no dynamics on
the aggregate output level before the long run, one can observe highly dynamical pattern
at the disaggregated level. Similar to the case of consumption subsidies, low- and high-
tech firms behave differently in response to the policy. But, in contrast to the consumption
policy, high-tech firms react in the short run by contracting and low-tech firms by expanding.
Apparently, as a major difference to the consumption subsidizing, low-tech firms rather than
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Figure 12: Policy effect on output levels of high-tech (a) and low-tech firms (b).
high-tech firms benefit more from the investment subsidies after the first implementation of
the policy. In the aggregate, the increase of output of low-tech firms offsets the declining
output of high-tech firms such that no significant effect on total output emerges.
Why does the policy give low-tech firms more incentives to expand in the short term?
As already pointed out in Section 4.3.1, high- and low-tech firms differ with respect to wage
offers; while high-tech firms offer competitive wages for high-skilled workers, low-tech firms
post competitive wage offers for low-skilled workers. At the same time, the employment level
of high-skilled workers is considerably higher. As a consequence, a great share of the stock
of available workers consists of low-skilled workers. This implies a structural disadvantage
of high-tech firms in hiring additional workers during this period.
The policy does not generate more real demand in the short term. Hence, a short-term
expansion of high-tech firms could only be reached by implementing an aggressive pricing
strategy that forces low-tech firms out of the market. But as they also face labor market
rigidities which make aggressive pricing more expensive, high-tech firms assess this strategy
as being non-profitable. In this case, the subsidies are taken as windfall gains without trig-
gering further investments. At the same time, the initial investment level of low-tech firms
is low, i.e. most of the low-tech firms appraise capital investments as not being worthwhile
given the current market environment. With subsidized capital prices, investments become
cheaper and the likelihood of an investment project to break even increases. This results
in more investments of low-tech firms and consequently affects their production capacity.
Together with the higher attractiveness for better available low-skill workers, an increased
production capacity gives low-tech firms the opportunity to gain additional market shares.
The expansionary strategy of low-tech firms in the short run is associated with intensified
labor market activities that trigger the cost-driving increase of base wage offers. Eventually,
the higher production costs in combination with the aggressive pricing lead to a decline
of low-tech firms’ profitability that limits the scope of action for keeping the aggressive
competitive strategy. In the following, low-tech firms relax the expansion, which gives high-
tech firms the opportunity to adjust the strategy toward a more competitive one. The
changing competitiveness explains why there the process of convergence between high- and
low-tech firms ceases temporarily in the medium term.
Figure 11 (c) has illustrated that the labor market is characterized by a high tightness
in the medium run. This is exactly when high-tech firms pursue an expansionary strategy.
The high labor market tension has basically two effects on the expanding high-tech firms:
first, it increases the costs of hiring workers such that eventually the production costs of
high-tech firms rise. And second, a greater share of the cohort of new employees hired by
high-tech firms belongs to the group of low-skilled workers. An enhanced recruitment of
low-skilled workers leads to declining specific skills and general skills. The negative effect
on high-tech firms’s specific skills emerges as the additionally hired low-skill workers have
a lower specific skill level compared to the incumbent workers. This is due to the fact that
these workers have mostly been employed by low-tech firms. The reduction of the general
skill level has a negative effect on the vintage choice. This in turn reduces the productivity
of the capital stock and amplifies the negative effect on the specific skills. Altogether, this
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Figure 13: Spline-smoothed policy effects of the technology subsidizing on the average annual
growth rate (b).
leads to a loss of competitiveness forcing high-tech firms to relax the expansionary strategy
after a certain period.
In the long run, low-tech firms take advantage of their improved relative costs structure
and re-start expanding. This output expansion is thereby fueled, on the one hand, by the
investment subsidies, which make the required adjustment of the capital stock cheaper,
and, on the other hand, by the fact that the labor market tension in the long run declines,
which prevents the emergence of similar cost dynamics as described above. This results in
the output convergence between high- and low-tech firms. As low-tech firms invest in less
productive vintages, the reallocation of workers from high- to low-tech firms leads to an
inefficient employment of the resources of the economy. As a consequence, the output gain
for low-tech firms cannot compensate the output loss of high-tech firms such that the overall
output effect is negative. Altogether, the findings regarding the investment policy can be
summarized in the following qualitative result:
Result 3: Despite a positive effect on the investment activities in the short and medium
term, the investment subsidizing policy does not generate additional output growth. Instead,
it has no growth effect in the short and medium term but a negative growth effect in the
long run. At the same time, the policy has an employment-promoting effect. But the higher
employment does not lead to more output since the policy causes also a negative effect on the
technological productivity of the capital stock in the economy. The negative long-term effect
on productivity is due to a relative expansion of low -tech firms in the long run, which is the
result of path-dependencies triggered by differing policy reactions of high- and low-tech firms
in the short run.
4.3.3 The Technology Subsidy Policy
The technology subsidizing policy is the third stabilization policy that has been identified in
Section 4.2 as being successful in smoothing the business cycle. The general principle of this
policy is similar to the principles underlying the investment policy with a crucial difference:
only those investments are subsidized that will flow into the most up-to-date technology.
Figure 13 shows the policy effect on the long-term growth. The technology policy has
a positive effect on the long-term growth of the economy, where the average annual growth
rate increases from 1.6% up to 1.9%, which is clearly the strongest growth effect of the three
considered policies.
Figure 14 illustrates how the policy affects the evolution of the aggregated output.
Panel (a), which depicts the effect on the output level, shows that the additional average
growth is translated into a growing output premium. Panel (b) displaying the policy effect
on the quarterly growth rates highlights that the growth effect does not unfold immediately.
The idea behind the technology policy is to provide incentives for firms to invest in the
best practice technology. This is supposed to increase the speed of technological diffusion,
which, through a consequently higher productivity in the economy, might generate additional
and sustainable real growth. Panel (c) shows how the policy affects the average vintage
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Figure 14: Spline-smoothed policy effects of the technology subsidizing on the evolution
of aggregated output (a), the evolution of quarterly growth rates (b), productivity of the
average vintage choice (c), and the average capital productivity (d).
choice of firms. Generally, the average productivity of the acquired capital is significantly
higher compared to the base scenario suggesting that, indeed, the policy affects the average
vintage choice of firms positively. Moreover, the effect seems to become stronger over time
but also stronger for higher policy intensities. Panel (d) shows the impact of the policy on
the average productivity of the capital stock. One can see that the positive effect on the
vintage choice translates into a substantial increase of the productivity. Quantitatively, the
strength of the effect on capital productivity resembles the effect on the output trajectory.
It appears that most of the growth of total output is driven by the faster diffusion of new
technologies.
According to the wage adjustment rule described in Section 3.6, the productivity growth
triggered by the policy is passed on the wages of workers and causes additional growth of
nominal wages. In this case, however, the resulting higher labor expenditures are compen-
sated by a higher productivity such that firms’ unit labor costs are not forced up. This
has two implications: First, with the nominal wages also the nominal consumption budget
increases. And second, the low cost effects of the policy avoid a similar inflation pressure as
it has been observed for the consumption and investment policy. Hence, only a small share
of the additionally generated nominal demand is inflated. As a result, the policy generates
not only nominal demand but also a considerable amount of real demand. This real demand
can be satisfied as the economy becomes more productive.
As in the discussion of the two other policies, we now turn to a more differentiated
discussion of the policy implications for the heterogeneous firms. In Figure 15 we depict
the policy effect on the output trajectory of high-tech and low-tech firms. In the short
term, the technology policy generates a negative effect on the output trajectory of high-tech
firms, whereas low-tech firms can increase their output. Both translates into a short-term
reduction of output heterogeneity. In the medium term, however, high-tech firms intensify
the output growth such that the gap to the output level of the base scenario starts to
decline. At the same time, the low-tech firms lower their output with the result that the
output heterogeneity increases. This process continues into the long run.
But how does the policy affect the vintage choice of high- and low-tech firms? Figure 16
26
0 50 100 150
0
5
10
15
20
linear predictor
t
pa
ra
m
e
te
r
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
1.05
 0.86 
 0.88 
 0.9 
 0.92 
 0.94 
 0.96 
 0.98 
 
1 
 
1.
02
 
 1.02 
 1.04 
 1.06 
0 50 100 150
0
5
10
15
20
linear predictor
t
pa
ra
m
e
te
r
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
 1 
 1 
 1.05 
 1.1 
 1.15 
 1.2 
 1.25 
 1.3 
 1.35 
(a) (b)
Figure 15: Policy effect on the aggregated output trajectory of high-tech (a) and low-tech
firms (b).
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Figure 16: Policy effect on the vintage choice of high (a) and low-tech firms (b).
illustrates that there are substantial differences between the policy effects on high- and low-
tech firms. More precisely, the vintage choice of low-tech firms is less affected compared to
the vintage choice of high-tech firms, where the difference builds up over time. Even with
subsidies, there is still a considerable gap between the productivity of purchased capital of
low-tech firms and the frontier productivity.
The mechanism that leads to the initially differing competitive responses of high- and low-
tech firms is basically the same as for the investment policy. Since the technology subsidizing
does not affect the market demand in the short run, high-tech firms react passively. This
is because an increased production capacity would only lead to higher market shares when
high-tech firms implement a predatory pricing strategy. At the same time, high-tech firms
also face the structural disadvantage at the labor market that the more available low-skilled
workers prefer to work for low-tech firms. As a consequence, high-tech firms would have
to increase the base wage offers in order to attract more workers. This would increase the
unit costs and would reduce the profit prospects for an aggressive competitive strategy.
For low-tech firms, in contrast, the policy reduces investment barriers such that they have
the opportunity to build up production capacities. At the same time, they have better
access to the available pool of workers and can hire the amount of employees required for
an expansionary strategy.
But how does the targeting of the investment subsidies contribute to the differences
to the case of untargeted subsidies in the investment policy scenario? An explanation is
that, in contrast to the investment policy, the technology policy has quantitatively different
effects on the productivity of high-tech and low-tech firms in the short term. At the outset
of the simulation, the general skill distribution is highly polarized among high- and low-
tech firms. Since high-tech firms have a high average general skill level, the vintage choice
of these firms is already close to the frontier. In this case, the subsidizing has almost no
impact on their productivity. On the contrary, due to the low average general skills, the
vintage choice of low-tech firms is off the frontier. This productivity gap provides more scope
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for the policy to affect the productivity of low-tech firms. Actually, low-tech firms intensify
their investments, thereby choosing the best practice technology more frequently during this
period. As a consequence, the productivity of the capital stock of low-tech firms shows a
much higher growth rate than the productivity of high-tech firms. This technological catch-
up improves low-tech firms’ position in the competition and amplifies the output convergence
in the short run.
Nevertheless, in order to achieve the required expansion of the workforce, low-tech firms
have to increase the base wage offers, which eventually drives the production costs. This in
turn gives high-tech firms the opportunity to gradually increase the output in the medium
run. The emerging output expansion of high-tech firms is accompanied by intensified in-
vestments where these investments strongly improve the capital productivity through the
targeting of the investment subsidies. As a result, the process of productivity convergence
stops and turns into divergence. The diverging productivity widens the spread between the
wage offers for high-skill workers so that high-tech firms can increase the attractiveness for
this skill group. In the following, a self-reinforcing feedback effect emerges that causes the
divergence of firms’ capital productivity and output in the long term: Due to the improved
relative attractiveness, high-tech firms can increase the share of high-skilled workers in their
workforce, while the average general skill level of low-tech firms declines. As the subsidizing
of the best practice technology is not as effective for low-tech firms as for their high-tech
competitors, the declining general skill level reduces the average productivity of their vintage
choice. As a consequence, the productivity level of low- and high-tech firms diverge further,
which amplifies the advantage of high-tech firms at the labor market to hire high-skill work-
ers. This in turn reinforces the polarization of the general skill distribution among firms. In
the end, low-tech firms have no possibility for catching up technologically as their general
skill level is now clearly inferior. Moreover, they cannot increase the workforce as soon as
the low-skilled labor force is exhausted. For this reason, one can observe the long-term
divergence of low- and high-tech firms in terms of output and productivity. Wrapping up
the observations, we can write the following qualitative result:
Result 4: The business cycle smoothing by subsidizing the adoption of the best practice
technology leads to strong and sustainable long-term growth. This growth effect arises through
a faster diffusion of new technologies and the resulting more productive capital stock in the
economy. At the same time, the policy has almost no effect on inflation. The long-term
growth effect is amplified by a crowding out of low-tech firms, which is triggered by high-tech
firms mostly benefiting from the technology policy.
4.4 Robustness Checks
The policy results discussed in the previous section have been obtained from simulations
conditioned on the specific setting of exogenous model parameters. However, a variation
of single model parameters or interaction effects of a simultaneous variation of multiple
parameters can have substantial impacts on the simulation outcome, which might influence
the results of the policy analysis. For this reason, it is important to analyze whether the
policy analysis is robust against a variation of model parameters.
In this subsection we describe robustness checks that study the effects of a variation of
the model’s parametrization on the outcomes of the policy scenarios. In particular, we focus
on the robustness of the qualitative results of the policy experiments with respect to the
reduction of the business cycle volatility and the impacts on the long-term growth rate. For
each stabilization policy, we have run simulations in which the parameter setting has been
determined by independent and uniformly distributed random draws from a parameter space
that covers 30% intervals around the default parameters values of the model parameters (see
Table 1). Additionally, we have drawn values for the policy intensity parameter µ randomly
from the ranges between 0 and the maximum intensities µmax. Altogether, we have run
1500 Monte Carlo simulations based on these random parameter settings for each of the
policies. The pooled simulations can then be used to estimate regression models with long-
term growth and short-term volatility as dependent variables, in which model parameters
and the policy intensity µ are deployed as covariates.
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Figure 17: Estimated smooth terms for the policy intensity µ. The smooth terms are
estimated for the business cycle volatility (upper row) and growth rate (lower row) for the
consumption policy (left column), investment policy (middle column) and technology policy
(right column).
There are basically two types of effects of particular interest; the one is the isolated effect
of the policy intensity on growth and volatility, which can be used to generally check whether
the random choice of model parameters changes the effects of the policies substantially. To
extract the isolated effect, we formulate a Generalized Additive Model (GAM) in which all
model parameters and the policy intensity are wrapped in independent smooth functions.
We obtain the following estimated model:
g = g0 + sµ(µ) +
L∑
l=1
sl(ξl). (14)
g is the dependent variable (i.e. growth rate or business cycle volatility), g0 is a parametric
intercept and ξl with l = 1, ..., L is the set of model parameters. The estimated smooth
function sµ(µ) indicates the isolated effect of the policy on the dependent variable g.
The second type of effects are joint effects of µ with each of the model parameters. These
joint effects are supposed to illustrate how the policy impacts are affected by a variation of
each particular model parameter. The joint effect of the policy intensity and a parameter
ξk can be obtained by estimating the following GAM:
g = g0 +
k−1∑
l=1
sl(ξl) +
L∑
l=k+1
sl(ξl) + te(µ, ξk). (15)
In this model, each parameter except ξk, for which the interaction is assessed, is included in
independent smooth functions to capture their impacts on the dependent variable g. The
tensor product smooth function te(µ, ξk) indicates the joint effect and can be interpreted as
the effect of the policy intensity µ conditioned the parametrization of ξk.
Let us first consider the isolated effects of the policies given the random choice of model
parameters. Figure 17 depicts the estimated smooth term sµ representing the isolated effects
on the business cycle volatility (upper row) and average growth rate (lower row) for the three
policies. The figure clearly indicates that the qualitative effects stay intact even if we deviate
from the default parametrization and select the parameter values randomly from a wider
parameter space around their defaults.
We now turn to the joint effects. In the following discussion we report the interaction
effects only for selected model parameters. For the business cycle volatility we present the
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Figure 18: Joint smooth terms of the policy intensity and the parameter investment planning
horizon TLT (upper row), expected demand volatility σ2D (middle row), and service level of
demand χS (lower row), estimated for the GAM explaining the business cycle volatility. Left
column: consumption policy, middle column: investment policy, right column: technology
policy.
interaction for the parameters investment planning horizon TLT , expected demand volatil-
ity σ2D, and service level in the production planning χ
S . For the average growth rate we
limit the discussion on the depreciation rate δ, the investment planning horizon TLT , the
speed of technological change ∆qinv and the intensity of consumers’ choice γC . We opt for
these parameters as they have been identified to have the strongest impacts on the business
cycle volatility and the average growth rate (see Harting, 2014). We have also checked the
interaction effects for the other parameters but, compared to the effects of the parameters
above, they are qualitatively similar and quantitatively negligible.
Figure 18 and 19 show the estimated joint effects of the sensitive parameters and the
policy intensity µ (i.e. the tensor product smooth term te(µ, ξk)) on the business cycle
volatility (Figure 18) and long-term growth rate (Figure 19). Apparently, the variation of
the sensitive model parameters does not qualitatively change the effect of the three policies.
Altogether, a variation of model parameters in the neighborhood around their default values
does not change the qualitative findings of the policy analysis. This means the results are
robust and valid not only for the specific parameter setting used for the policy experiments.
It should be noted that this does not mean that the effects identified in the policy
analysis are generic results which can be obtained from any parametrization of the model.
However, the parametrization used for the experiments has not been chosen arbitrarily. It
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Figure 19: Joint smooth terms for the policy intensity and the parameter depreciation rate
δ (first row), investment planning horizon TLT (second row), speed of the frontier growth
∆qinv (third row), and the intensity of consumers’ choice γC (fourth row), estimated for the
GAM explaining the average growth rate. Left column: consumption policy, middle column:
investment policy, right column: technology policy.
has rather been obtained from a systematic attempt to estimate and calibrate the model.
The underlying assumption for this parametrization method is that the parameter space
is restricted by, on the one hand, empirically observed values for parameters that have
empirical counterparts and, on the other hand, by values for the other parameters that
lead to economically reasonable simulation outcomes. The parametrization used for the
simulations represents such a specification and a too strong deviation from this parameter
setting is associated with a general reduction of the economic prediction power of the model.
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Figure 20: Policy effects of the consumption (upper row), investment (middle row), and
technology subsidizing policy (lower row) on volatility (left column) and average growth
rates (right column) for different initial conditions of the economy.
Besides the parametrization of the model, the initial condition of the economy can also
have a strong impact on the simulation outcome. The initial condition describes the en-
dowment and memory of agents with which they enter the first iteration of the simulation.
In Section 3.8 we have explained that the start state used for the experiments has been a
snapshot of a pre-simulation. The pre-simulation started with an equal initialization of all
agents except for some variables as, for example, the general skill endowment of households.
The iteration used as start state for the simulations has been chosen such that the simulation
has passed the transient phase.
In the following, we want to demonstrate that the results from the policy analysis are
also qualitatively robust against a variation of this specific start state. Therefore, we have
run a set of simulations based on the default parametrization in which we varied the date
TPol at which the stabilization policies are introduced for the first time. Actually, this leads
to an expansion of the pre-simulation, so that also here the start states are not determined
arbitrarily. The maximum deferral of the policy implementation is by 250 months so that we
vary TPol between month 1 and month 250 (in the experiments, TPol has been set to 1). In
order to make the indicators for the effectiveness of the policy comparable, we have to adjust
the length of the simulations accordingly such that the total simulation time is TPol + 500
months. The business cycle volatility and the average growth rate are then computed for
the last 500 months.
We estimate the impact of TPol on the business cycle volatility and the average growth
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rate with the following GAM:
g = g0 + te(µ, T
Pol). (16)
In Figure 20 we depict predictions for the business cycle volatility (left panels) and the
average growth rate (right panels) for the three stabilization policies. One can see that
especially the average growth rate varies substantially conditioned on different start states
where apparently for start states that are lagged by 100 months the growth rate reaches a
maximum. Nevertheless, the qualitative results regarding the effects of the three policies
stay intact for both, the effect on the business cycle volatility and the average growth rate.
This suggests that the start state at which the policy is applied for the first time does not
change the qualitative findings of our policy experiments. The policy results are then not
only robust against the parametrization but also against the selection of initial start states
from possible candidates generated by the pre-simulation.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed three distinctive fiscal policies, each of them aiming at
a stabilization of the economy during downturns. The first stabilization policy has been
a demand-oriented policy that provides consumption subsidies to households. The two
other policies have been supply-oriented policies that provide subsidies to firms in order to
encourage them to carry out investments in physical capital. The supply-oriented policies
differ from each other in their technological alignment; while the one policy grants subsidies
for any investment regardless its technological focus, the payout of subsidies is limited for
the other policy to those investments that flow in the best practice technology. The choice of
these policies has been motivated by real world examples of stabilization policies contained
in economic stimulus packages enacted by the U.S. government during the economic crisis
starting in 2008.
The goal of the policy analysis has been to addressed the following research questions:
Are the three policies actually able to stabilize the economy? Do the policies have long-term
effects on the economic growth? And if so, do the long-term implications differ between the
policies? While the first research question addresses the effectiveness of the policies with
respect to their primary goal, the other questions address possible long-term effects that are
not the direct purpose of the policies.
We have run extensive simulations of a closed agent-based macro model from which we
have obtained robust results. In particular, we have found that all three policies have similar
effects on the business cycle volatility. They substantially reduce short-term fluctuations
where a higher reduction of the volatility can be achieved by increasing the policy intensity.
As a result, there are only little differences between the policies regarding their original aim.
Regarding possible growth effects, however, we have obtained a more ambiguous picture.
The technology subsidizing policy has a strong growth-enhancing effect that is increasing in
the policy intensity. The consumption subsidizing policy leads only to a slight improvement
of the average growth rate, where the effect of this policy becomes also stronger with an
increasing intensity of the policy. In contrast, the investment subsidizing policy leads to a
reduction of economic growth that is not monotonic in the policy intensity; for this policy we
could identify a critical policy intensity at which the policy has its greatest negative impact
on the average growth rate. Altogether, these observations lead to a striking conclusion:
even if the policies are almost equally effective in smoothing the business cycle, they differ
substantially regarding their implications for long-term growth.
What are the implications for the economic literature? The question whether stabi-
lization policies have effects on long-term growth has especially been addressed by the en-
dogenous growth literature with inconclusive results. Many studies have concluded possible
effects by analyzing the effect of short-term fluctuations on long-term growth without explic-
itly considering stabilization policies in their analysis. Others have incorporated a (fiscal)
stabilization policy, but focused on the automatic stabilizers income tax and unemployment
payments without paying attention to a more elaborate design of discretionary stabilization
policies. The endogenous growth literature has stressed the importance of structural factors
of the models under consideration for the long-term effects of stabilization polices. Struc-
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tural factors can thereby be the assumption regarding the mechanism generating endogenous
growth (Schumpeterian models versus learning-by-doing hypothesis) or the source of shocks
driving the short-term volatility (monetary versus real shocks). Our analysis suggests that
besides those structural aspects also the concrete design of the policy plays an important
role for long-term effects of stabilization policies. In that sense, maybe the wrong question
has been posed in the literature. Given our findings, the question should not be whether
stabilization policies foster or reduce long-term growth, the question should be which stabi-
lization policies foster and which reduce long-term growth.
The results obtained from our policy analysis have also strong implications for policy-
makers. In general, policymakers can choose from a wide variety of different discretionary
policy measures to alleviate an economic downturn. Our policy experiments suggest that
different policy opportunities may have different consequences for the economic development
in the medium and long run, even if they can equally stabilize the economy in the short
run. For our policy examples, we have shown that a policy supporting the speed of techno-
logical change seems to be the best choice as it leads to sustainable long-term growth and
at the same time to stable prices. The only negative aspect of this policy is its long-term
impact on the market concentration. Unlike for the technology policy, we have found more
serious conflicts of goals for consumption subsidizing and untargeted investment subsidizing
policies. The most striking one can be found for the case of investment subsidization; if
the government grants subsidies for any investment without technological targeting, then
the short-term stabilization leads to a reduction of long-term growth. For consumption
subsidizing policies, one can find a serious conflict especially between short-term stability
and the goal of price stability. In that sense, the policy measures contained in the U.S.
stimulus package of 2009 with their technology-oriented targeting could be considered as
a more appropriate choice for a farsighted stabilization policy. Such a policy would have
potential to bring the U.S. economy not only back on its pre-crisis output level but also
at a higher long-term growth path. Nevertheless, policymakers should be aware of the fact
that any stabilization policy comes at a price. It is then the job of policymakers to carefully
assess possible long-terms effects of their candidate policies and to rate which of the possible
negative consequences have higher or lower priorities.
A Model setup and Parameter Setting
Table 1 shows the benchmark parametrization used for the simulations throughout the
paper. Table 2 shows the set up of the model with respect to the number of agents used in
the simulations. Note that for consumption goods firms Table 2 shows the initial number
of firms as the actual number of firms varies over time due to endogenous firm exit and
random firm entry. Additionally to the number of agents, the table reports the general skill
distribution of households and the general skill specific speeds of the adjustment of specific
skills.
B Statistical Analysis with Generalized Additive Mod-
els
We have made an extensive use of Generalized Additive Models with penalized splines to
evaluate the policy experiments statistically. There are basically three applications of GAMs
in the paper:
1. In the policy experiments we consider a variation of the policy intensity parameter µ
within a range between 0 and a maximum µmax. The case µ = 0 is thereby the case
where no policy is applied. In order to show how a variation of this policy parameter
changes the behavior of the model, we have run simulations of the model in which we
stepwise increased parameter µ. For each value of µ, we have run 12 batch runs and
determined the business cycle volatility and the average growth rate for each of the
runs. As a result, we have obtained pairs of observations for business cycle volatility
and growth from each run, to which we can assign a specific value of µ. In order to
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Symbol Name Value
tax Income tax rate 0.025
κ Consumption adjustment 0.001
δ Capital depreciation rate 0.01
χS Service level expected demand 0.7
γC Intensity of consumer choice 12.0
ρ Discount rate 0.02
∆qinv Technological progress 0.05
TEx Maximum deferral period 24
σV Demand volatility 0.1
TLT Investment planning horizon 60
σ2D Expected variance 0.1
TLoan Debt repayment period 18
ω Debt rescaling factor 0.50
rc ECB base rate 0.03
mrc ECB rate markdown deposit rate 0.1
df Dividend payout ratio 0.70
d¯ Threshold full dividends (firms) 0.5
αb Basel capital requirement 10.0
βb Min. cash reserve ratio 0.10
hFB Firm birth hazard rate 0.01
sF Initial equity for start ups 4.0
ϕ Wage update 0.01
ψ Wage reservation update 0.01
%up Upper bound firing 0.1
γgen Logit parameter general skills 0.5
u Unemployment benefit pct 0.55
Table 1: Parametrization of the model.
Symbol Name Value
Agents
Households 1600
Firms (initially) 80
Investment good producers 1
Banks 2
Central Bank 1
Government 1
General skill distribution
bgenh = 1 Low-skilled workers 50%
bgenh = 2 High-skilled workers 50%
Specific skill adaptation speed
χ(bgenh = 1) Speed for low-skilled workers 0.0125
χ(bgenh = 2) Speed for high-skilled workers 0.03703
Table 2: Set-up of the model.
measure the effect of µ on the two indicator variables, we have estimated a GAM that
is described by
g = g0 + s(µ). (17)
In this expression, g is the response variable (business cycle volatility or growth rate)
that is assumed to be distributed following some exponential family distribution, the
policy intensity µ is the covariate of the statistical model and g0 is a parametric
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Figure 21: Left: Box plots for the average growth rates based on simulations for different
values of µ. Right: Estimated GAM of the same data.
intercept. The term s(µ) is an unknown smooth function that depends on covariate
µ. Figure 21 illustrates how the single observations for the growth rate under the
technology policy are translated into predictions of the GAM.
2. For some variables such as aggregate output, it is of particular interest how the policy
effect evolves over time. Therefore, one has to study the effect of µ on the evolution
of time series data. In order to estimate the effect of a variation of µ statistically, we
have set up a statistical model in which the policy effect is statistically co-explained by
a second covariate, namely time t; to account for both explanatory variables, we have
specified a GAM, in which the smooth term jointly depends on t (in quarters) and µ.
Technically speaking, since isotropic smooth terms of the sort of s(t, µ) are only good
choices when covariates are on the same scale, which is not the case for µ and t, we
opt for tensor product smooth terms to explain the joint effect of policy intensity and
time (see Wood, 2006). The GAM is then described by
g = g0 + te(t, µ). (18)
In Section 4.3, we illustrate the evolution of policy effects with means of heat maps
in which the color code indicates the strength of the policy effect estimated from
the Spline model with time (at x axis) and the intensity parameter µ (at y axis) as
predictor variables. The strength of the effect is thereby determined relative to to
baseline scenario without policy. In particular, it is determined either by
geff =
g0 + te(t, µ)
g0 + te(t, µ = 0)
(19)
or by
geff = te(t, µ)− te(t, µ = 0), (20)
depending on whether aggregates (e.g. total output) or rates (e.g. growth rates) are
considered.
3. GAMs have also been used for the robustness checks of the policy results as described
in Section 4.4.
The GAMs have been estimated with the statistic software R using the function gam()
from the mgcv package (e.g., Wood, 2011).
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